The Thinking Behind Trump’s Troop Cut in Germany - The Wall Street Journal

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Walter Russell Mead

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June 10, 2020 12:46 pm ET

President Trump greets members of the military at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Dec. 27, 2018.

Photo: Andrew Harnik/Associated Press

President Trump’s decision to withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany stunned officials in both countries—including many in his own administration. The U.S. troop presence in Germany not only deters Russian aggression; it reassures Germany’s neighbors east and west that Berlin will never again disturb the peace of Europe or threaten their security.

To cut that troop commitment at all strikes virtually the entire U.S. foreign-policy establishment as dangerous; to cut the commitment without careful consultations with Germany and surrounding countries looks irresponsible. To do something this disruptive out of pique, as some allege, over Chancellor Angela Merkel’s refusal to attend a proposed June Group of Seven conference appears to many seasoned diplomats and observers as an act of near madness. The chief beneficiary of such a step would be Vladimir Putin, whose main strategic goals involve weakening trans-Atlantic bonds and those connecting Berlin with the rest of the European Union. The move has revived the never entirely dormant belief among some that Mr. Trump is, for whatever reason, subordinating U.S. interests to Moscow’s.

The Trump administration’s policies toward Germany are, like many of the White House’s decisions, poorly integrated into any kind of overarching strategy. But these policies are not simply random acts of spite. They reflect a convergence between some of Mr. Trump’s longtime instincts about foreign affairs and those of three groups of thinkers who are outside the conventional foreign-policy establishment, but even so exercise significant political influence.

The first are economic nationalists, for whom Germany’s $67 billion trade surplus with the U.S. is a prime concern. From their point of view, Germany’s trading relationship with America is abusive. Berlin shelters behind unfair trade rules dating in some cases to the 1950s, when Americans wanted to promote European economic integration during the Cold War. The euro, whose value is kept low by the economic weakness of countries like Italy and France, in effect subsidizes German exports.

To these neomercantilists, Berlin’s approach to trade undermines the U.S. economy and, therefore, America’s ability to pursue its global objectives. In this view, using America’s military presence in Europe (and the threat of removing it) as a way to change German trade policy isn’t an act of foreign-policy vandalism. It’s a smart way to defend American interests.

The second group consists of self-described “realists” whose revisionist views on American foreign policy include the belief that the U.S. needs a less ambitious and less ideological foreign policy. This group also sees Russia as a natural partner in any contest with China. Some in this category are aligned with the left wing of the Democratic Party; others lean right and influence Republican politicians like Sen. Rand Paul.

For many in this group, the trans-Atlantic focus of American foreign policy is a problem. They consider the U.S. troop presence part of an outdated commitment to deter Russian aggression. These thinkers believe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in its present form prevents Europeans from taking appropriate steps to defend themselves, drives Moscow into the arms of Beijing, and imposes an unnecessarily expensive strategic model on American defense planning. Ideologically, the trans-Atlantic alliance pulls the U.S. in a liberal direction (support for democracy, multilateralism, international institutions) that these analysts tend to deplore.

The third group includes the supporters of nationalist populism in America and beyond. For neonationalist thinkers and activists like Steve Bannon, the ideological projects of the “cosmopolitan” EU and Germany are inimical to values they believe are critical to social well-being and to a healthy international system. These intellectuals can sympathize with the Hungarian and Polish governments in their battles with Brussels, and some even look to Mr. Putin as a defender of “traditional values.”

Like Mr. Trump, they dislike international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the International Criminal Court. Berlin’s strong advocacy of universal values and transnational structures makes it a special target of their ire. They would like to see Mr. Trump take an even more confrontational stance toward Germany and its dreams of world order.

For all the tension in U.S.-German relations, the Trump approach has yet to produce real policy changes in Germany. Nevertheless, behind Mr. Trump’s Germany policy is an unorthodox but, in its way, consistent worldview that unites the leading intellectuals in the pro-Trump space.

Neo-mercantilism, skepticism about the strategic value of the American presence in Europe, and opposition to cosmopolitan internationalism are among the most basic elements of the Trumpian worldview. A second Trump term would almost certainly see continuing tensions with Berlin.

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